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Abstract 
This paper uses one-minute returns on the TOPIX and S&P500 to examine the 
efficiency of the Tokyo and New York Stock Exchanges. Our major finding is that 
Tokyo completes reactions to New York within six minutes, but New York reacts 
within fourteen minutes. Dividing the sample period into three subperiods, we found 
that the efficiency has improved and the magnitude of reaction has become larger 
over the period in both markets. The magnitude of response in New York to a fall in 
Tokyo is roughly double that of a rise. 
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1.  Introduction 
Stock prices of major economies are well known to be interdependent, and there is an extensive 
literature on international stock price linkage (Eun and Shim (1989), Jeon and von Furstenberg 
(1990), Mathur and Subrahmanyam (1990), Jeon and Chiang (1991), Chan et al. (1992), Kasa 
(1992), Corhay et al. (1993), Blackman et al. (1994), Chung and Liu (1994), Choudhry (1994, 
1997), and Hirayama and Tsutsui (1998a, b)), including a few research papers which investigate 
the possible causes of the linkage (Tsutsui (2002), Tsutsui and Hirayama (2004b, c)). One of the 
findings in this literature is that a country’s stock prices tend to advance when a neighboring 
market, closing just before that of the country’s market, has advanced (Tsutsui and Hirayama 
2004a). 
Therefore, one can predict the course of the stock price index of the Tokyo stock market, 
such as the TOPIX or the Nikkei 225, by observing whether the stock price indices of the New 
York stock market, such as the S&P500 and the New York Dow Jones Industrial Average 
(henceforth known as NYDJ), have advanced or declined. This predictability might seem to 
contradict the market efficiency hypothesis, but such is not the case. When the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) is open for trading, the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) is closed due to time 
differences. Consequently, one must wait for the opening of the TSE to execute transactions 
based on the new information from New York. If the Tokyo stock market is efficient, the TOPIX 
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reacts fully to the information of the S&P500 on the previous day at the opening but is not 
influenced thereafter. 
Using daily opening and closing values, Tsutsui (2002) found that the Nikkei 225 reacts to a 
large change (over 1.5%) of NYDJ by the closing time of the next day, and the Nikkei 225 does 
not show a significant change beyond the following day. Thus, the Tokyo stock market is efficient 
over the daily time span. 
Although the studies above use daily observations at best, there is a body of literature that 
utilizes observations of high frequency.1  The markets for foreign exchange and interest rate 
futures seem to react extremely rapidly to macroeconomic news announcements, e.g., within 
forty seconds according to Ederington and Lee (1995) and Almeida et al. (1998). However, 
equity markets respond more slowly to earnings and dividend announcements, requiring ten to 
fifteen minutes (Patell and Wolfson (1984)). The response of the S&P500 index to unexpected 
changes in the money supply and Consumer Price Index (CPI) is completed within one hour (Jain 
(1988)). In this paper, we will employ one-minute returns on the TOPIX and the S&P500 to 
analyze the speed of reactions of each stock exchange to the other. 
The only work thus far, to our knowledge, using intraday data in a study of the price linkage 
                                                  
1For an overall introduction to high-frequency finance, see Dacorogna et al. (2001). Goodhart and O’Hara 
(1997) is also a good review and companion papers in the same Journal of Empirical Finance, vol. 4, no. 
2-3 are research results with high-frequency data. 
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between the U.S. and Japanese stock markets is that of Becker et al. (1992). They used hourly 
data for the S&P500 and Nikkei 225 Indices from October 5, 1985 to December 31, 1989. They 
calculated the correlations between hourly returns of one country with the other country’s daily 
return of the previous day.2 They found that the effect of the previous day’s Nikkei return on the 
subsequent S&P500 returns is absorbed within the first half hour after opening in New York, 
while the effect of the previous day’s S&P500 return on the subsequent Nikkei returns is 
absorbed within the first hour of trading in Tokyo, and that the effect of the lagged S&P500 
returns on the subsequent Nikkei returns is larger than the reverse effect. 
Thus, the stock markets in Tokyo and New York seem to absorb the effects from the other 
stock exchange rather rapidly. However, due to the hourly observations that they used we cannot 
infer how speedily the effects are absorbed. In other words, we cannot compare the relative 
efficiency of the two stock markets. 
This paper uses high-frequency data to examine the market efficiency of the Tokyo and New 
York stock markets. We obtained the tick data for the S&P500 from Tickdata.com and the TOPIX 
data at one-minute intervals from the Tokyo Stock Exchange.3 Our data started earlier, but to 
avoid the extreme effects of Black Monday, we discarded data before December 1987. The last 
                                                  
2 Since the New York Stock Exchange opens at 09:30 EST, the first US return of the day is a half-hour 
return from 09:30 to 10:00. 
3 The TOPIX is a capitalization-weighted index of all the stocks listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
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day for our sample was November 27, 2003. By comparing how quickly each stock market reacts 
to the other’s movements, we can infer which market is more efficient in absorbing the effects of 
the other. Further, since our sample period is considerably longer than that used in Becker et al. 
(1992), we can also examine whether there was a change in this efficiency during the sample 
period.  
 
2. Intraday patterns of one-minute stock returns 
2.1  Intraday patterns of TOPIX returns 
We obtained the TOPIX data at one-minute intervals from 09:01 to 15:00 JST (Japan 
Standard Time) from May 23, 1987 to November 27, 2003 from the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
There was a two-hour lunch break between 11:00 and 13:00 until April 26, 1991 and a 90 minute 
lunch break between 11:00 and 12:30 after April 30, 1991. Although the actual starting date of 
our dataset is May 23, 1987, we deleted observations up to the end of 1987 in order to avoid 
overwhelming influence of the Black Monday. One-minute returns of the TOPIX are computed 
as: 
                  ,100
1
1×−
−−=
hhmmatTOPIX
hhmmatTOPIXhhmmatTOPIXRJhhmmt           (1) 
where hhmm is a four-digit number denoting the hours and minutes in Japan Standard Time and 
hhmm–1 refers to the time one minute before hhmm. It takes on values from 0901 to 1100 for the 
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morning session and from 1231 to 1500 for the afternoon session.4 The notation, 1000–1, means 
0959, but 0901–1 refers to 1500 of the previous day. Therefore, note that RJ0901 is actually an 
overnight return from the previous day’s close at 15:00. Likewise, 1231–1 is actually 1100, 
because there is a lunch break. Hence, RJ1231 is a 90-minute return from 11:00 to 12:31.  
These TOPIX returns, RJ0901, …, RJ1500, are averaged across days during the 
sixteen-year period (January 1988 to November 2003), and these means are plotted in Figure 1 
along with 95% confidence bands based on the null of a zero mean. We observe the following 
five characteristics of intraday one-minute stock returns in Tokyo: 
1) The first four minutes immediately following a day’s opening exhibit significantly positive 
returns.  
2) There are significantly positive returns for about six minutes before a day's closing.  
3) There are significantly negative returns for about ten minutes after the opening (12:31) of 
the afternoon session. 
4) One-minute returns tend to be negative after the first eight minutes of the day’s opening. 
Out of 52 one-minute returns from RJ0909 to RJ1000, there are 25 significantly negative 
values at a 95% level.  
5) Most returns other than the above are statistically not different from zero during the day. 
                                                  
4 Due to a longer lunch break, hhmm starts at 1301 and ends at 1500 for the afternoon session until April 26, 
1991. 
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There are only six cases of significant non-zero means for 60 one-minute returns during 
10:01 and 11:00. For the interval between 12:41 and 14:54, there are 11 such means out of 
134 one-minute returns.  
Table I lists summary statistics of selected daily TOPIX returns. Normality tests are not 
shown here, since the Jarque–Bera measure indicates overwhelming rejection of normality in 
every variable. The means exhibit the tendencies pointed out above. RJ0901 is actually the daily 
close-to-open overnight return, the mean of which is positive, whereas the daily open-to-close 
return (RJOC) is negative. There is a tendency for the TOPIX to rise during the night but to 
decline during the trading hours. The morning return between 09:01 and 12:31 (RJMN) tends to 
be negative, but the afternoon return between 12:31 and 15:00 (RJAN) positive. The volatility as 
measured by the standard deviation is higher at the opening of either the morning or the afternoon 
session and at the closing of the day. The serial correlation measured by the Ljung–Box statistic is 
also significant  during these minutes and daily returns such as RJCC.  
Autocorrelation coefficients (not displayed here) of these one-minute returns exhibit a rapid 
decay, but there is an apparent periodicity at five-minute intervals. After some experimentation, 
we found that this pattern of high autocorrelations at five-minute intervals appears after April 
1997.5 Further probes revealed that this pattern is caused by data between 09:00 and 10:00 and 
                                                  
5 However, it was weak during April 1997 and March 1998.  
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that a very high standard deviation is observed at 09:01, 09:06, 09:11, and 09:16. Volatile returns 
in these minutes are characterized by especially low negative values (large in absolute value). 
These returns are also characterized by very high autocorrelation with returns at the same minute 
of the previous day. We believe that this anomaly is caused by special quotes, which were 
introduced into the system in August 1998. These quotes are updated every five minutes, and are 
announced whenever the next equilibrium price exceeds a predetermined band. The quotes are 
set at the ceiling or the floor of this band and execution of orders is suspended temporarily. The 
announcement is designed to alert market participants to a substantial change in price and to 
encourage them to place orders to exploit the new information. When a special quote fails to 
induce the price to stay within the band, the band is doubled and a new special quote is announced 
after five minutes. Thus, the purpose of these quotes is to smooth out the price path. Since they 
are updated at five-minute intervals, they are likely to produce autocorrelation at this frequency. 
In addition, the overwhelming majority of special quotes are announced at the opening.6
Using five-minute returns of the Nikkei 225 Index, Andersen et al. (2000) examined their 
volatility during the period from 1994 to 1997. The mean returns averaged across days are plotted 
                                                  
6 The Volume Weighted Average Price (VWAP) transactions are also a candidate for the cause of this 
anomaly, since they were introduced in November 1997 and securities companies that undertake them are 
said to place buy and sell orders only periodically at five-minute intervals to minimize impacts on the 
market price. However, VWAP transactions are conducted throughout the day, which therefore contradicts 
the fact that this five-minute periodicity appears only during 9:00-10:00. 
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in their Figure 1A and these conform to points 2, 3, and 5 above. However, the opening of the 
morning session exhibits a negative return, which is inconsistent with point 1 above. This may be 
explained by their use of a linear filter to eliminate first-order autocorrelation. 
 
2.2   Why do positive returns prevail at opening and closing of daily trading? 
As shown above, the TOPIX exhibits significantly large positive returns at the opening and 
closing of daily trading. To investigate possible causes, we present correlation coefficients 
between the last 8-min. return (RJ08M1500) and other various returns in Table II. RJ08M1500 
has a weak positive correlation with the first 14-min. return of the day (RJ14M0915), but has a 
weak negative correlation with the subsequent close-to-open return (RJ0901+1) and the first 
14-min. return the following day (RJ14M0915+1). Thus, positive returns at the opening and at the 
closing do not seem to be linked. However, a significantly high positive correlation exists 
between RJ0901 and RJ14M0915, which indicates the following two possibilities. One is that 
high RJ0901 causes high RJ14M0915, in other words, there is a strong serial correlation in these 
minutes. The other is that these positive returns at the opening and at the subsequent times are 
produced by the same cause, i.e., the impact of the New York market. In the next section, we 
specify a model (equation (3)) that incorporates both the possibilities. Especially, we analyze the 
effect of close-to-close returns of the New York market on the previous day.  
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In a study of daytime (i.e., during trading hours) and overnight (i.e., during nontrading 
hours) returns in Tokyo, Tsutsui (2003) examines how the opening price reacts to a substantial 
rise or fall of the preceding closing price in Japan. He concludes that if the previous trading hours 
have reflected bearish trading, then the bearish sentiment will not be taken over to opening time, 
as opposed to when the previous trading hours reflect a more bullish attitude. Thus, the reaction is 
asymmetric depending on a fall or rise of the closing price. He also argues that a possible buying 
strategy of securities companies at the opening may be the cause of the rise during nontrading 
hours. These companies obviously benefit from higher stock prices which generate greater 
brokerage fees. This is an interesting view, but still needs evidence to support it. In addition, as 
positive returns at the opening are also recognized for S&P500 as shown in subsection I.D, the 
complete explanation should apply to both countries. 
Regarding the tendency for the TOPIX to rise toward the end of the day, we have no 
explanation at all. Because the S&P500 does not show a similar rise at closing, the cause should 
be specific to Japan. Thus, the batch process (called itayose 7) may be the cause for the positive 
return, but it requires additional explanation since the opening price of the afternoon session, 
                                                  
7 Opening and closing prices of the morning and afternoon session of the Tokyo Stock Exchange are 
formed by a batch process, called itayose, while other trades during the day are carried out by continuous 
trading, called zaraba. Amihud and Mendelson (1991) analyze itayose system and argue that this 
difference in the two price formation processes, itayose and zaraba, may produce differences in prices and 
trading volumes.  
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which is also formed by the batch process, exhibits a significant negative return. It is left as a 
puzzle for future research.  
 
2.3  Why does the TOPIX decline at the opening of the afternoon session? 
What about the apparent tendency of stock prices to decline at the opening of the afternoon 
session (point 3 above)? Our conjecture is that investors give a second thought to rising prices at 
the opening. This may also be behind the tendency of declining prices during 09:15 and 10:00 
(point 4 above). Correlation coefficients between the overnight return (RJ0901), the return during 
the lunch break (RJ1231), and the 45-min. return from 09:15 to 10:00 (denoted by RJ45M1000) 
are presented in Table III. RJ0901 is negatively correlated with both RJ1231 and RJ45M1000, 
which seems to support our view that advances at the opening are corrected afterwards.8  
Since correlation coefficients measure pair-wise relationships only, we also ran some 
regressions to explain the negative return at the opening of the afternoon session. We regressed 
the over-lunch return (RJ1231) on a constant, the overnight return (RJ0901), five one-minute 
returns immediately preceding the lunch break, and the dependent variable lagged by one day.9 
The result is shown under equation (i) in Table IV. The coefficient on RJ0901 is negative at a 6% 
significance level and the RJ1100 variable has also a highly significantly negative effect on the 
                                                  
8 There is, however, sensitivity to the choice of duration. The 50-min. return from 09:10 to 10:00 
(RJ50M1000) is positively correlated with RJ0901.  
9 See the next section for the details of this regression specification.  
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dependent variable. RJ1231 lagged one day has a significantly positive effect. Overall this 
regression gives an adequate explanation of RJ1231. 
Before introducing the 45-min. return, RJ45M1000, to the regression for RJ1231, let us 
consider what effects it may have on RJ1231. There are two views. First, suppose that the size of 
correction to an over-reaction at 09:01 is determined first and that it is divided into RJ45M1000 
and RJ1231. Then, if sufficient second thought is given during the 45-min. interval up to 10:00, 
the extent of corrective reaction at 12:31 must be small, making the coefficient on RJ45M1000 
negative. Second, suppose that the size of correction is not immediately known but is gradually 
revealed during the actual trading session. Then, if a relatively large adjustment occurred in 
RJ45M1000, it would lead to a further adjustment after lunch. In this instance, the coefficient on 
RJ45M1000 in a regression for RJ1231 tends to be significantly positive, indicating a further, 
strengthened correction after lunch. In any case, the lunch break gives investors further time to 
reconsider the excessive rise at the opening of the day.  
Equation (ii) of Table IV is the result of regressing RJ1231 on a constant, the overnight return 
at the opening (RJ0901), and the 45-min. return to 10:00 (RJ45M1000). The coefficient on 
RJ0901 is significantly negative at a 7% level and that on RJ45M1000 is positive at a 0.3% 
significance level. This result implies the second view above is appropriate.  
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We added five lagged one-minute returns and one-day lag of the dependent variable to the 
right-hand side and the basic result is the same in this equation (iii) of Table IV. These results 
imply that the mean negative return at the opening of the afternoon session is a reaction to the 
mean positive return at the opening of the morning session. Having lunch gives investors 
reflective time to digest the excessive rise at the day’s opening.  
 
2.4  Intraday patterns of S&P500 returns 
For the U.S. stock prices we obtained tick data on S&P500 from January 2, 1987 to 
November 27, 2003. As noted above, we discard observations up to the end of 1987. We compute 
one-minute returns of S&P500 as:      
            .100
1500&
1500&500& ×−
−−=
hhmmatPS
hhmmatPShhmmatPSRUhhmmt   (2) 
Since the New York Stock Exchange opens at 09:30 and closes at 16:00, hhmm takes on 
values from 0931 to 1600. Unlike Tokyo, the NYSE has no lunch break and trades shares 
continuously for six and a half hours every day. The time difference between Tokyo and New 
York is fourteen hours (thirteen hours during the Daylight Saving Time period). Expressed in 
Greenwich Mean Time, the trading hours are from 0:00 to 6:00 GMT in Tokyo and from 14:30 to 
21:00 GMT in New York (see Figure 2). Thus, the two markets are never synchronously open.  
Mean one-minute returns of S&P500 are plotted in Figure 3 along with 95% confidence 
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bands based on the null of a zero mean. We observe the following features from this Figure 
similar to those of TOPIX one-minute returns:  
1) The first seven minutes after the day’s opening tend to exhibit significantly positive returns. 
However, their absolute magnitude is smaller than that of Tokyo.  
2) The last four minutes before the day’s closing are also significantly positive, but their 
absolute magnitude is smaller than in Tokyo or the first few minutes after opening.  
3) Some of the returns tend to be negative between 9:51 and 10:13. Out of 23 one-minute 
returns during this interval, nine are significantly negative.  
4) Except for these intervals noted above, most of the mean returns are statistically not 
different from zero. Out of 343 one-minute returns during 10:13 and 15:56, only 28 are 
significant at a 5% level.  
The correlation coefficient between the overnight return at the opening (RU0931) and the 
45-min. return from 09:45 to 10:30 is –0.0401 with a t-statistic of 2.54, the p-value of which is 
1.1%, indicating a significantly negative correlation. As in Tokyo, this may also imply that the 
investors in the NYSE give a second thought to the rise at and immediately after the day's 
opening.  
Table V gives summary statistics for these and other daily returns.10 Again the normality is 
                                                  
10 There is a slight discrepancy in the data for S&P500. The S&P500 price level at 16:00 is not precisely 
equal to the closing value as reported by the TickWrite, software provided by the data vendor (TickData) 
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overwhelmingly rejected, thus not shown therein. Unlike the TOPIX, the S&P500 tends to rise 
during the trading hours (significantly positive open-to-close return,  RUOC). Most of this rise 
during the daytime occurs in the afternoon (significantly positive afternoon return from 13:01 to 
16:00, RUAN). The volatility is high when the market opens, as indicated by a high standard 
deviation of RU0931, but it declines gradually over time. There is no increase in volatility toward 
the end of the day. Serial correlation is also present at and immediately following the opening or 
for daily returns.  
 
 
3.  How quickly does one market react to the other? 
3.1  Correlation coefficients 
Since it is well known that the two stock markets affect each other, our primary focus here is 
on determining how rapidly this influence is absorbed after the opening of a market. As a 
preliminary investigation, we compute correlation coefficients between the previous day’s daily 
return in New York and each one-minute return in Tokyo. We denote by RUCC the daily 
close-to-close return in New York on the previous day.11
                                                                                                                                                                 
to retrieve data points at desired frequency. It turns out that the original tick data contain values at a few 
minutes after 16:00. The last value for the day is reported as the closing price. A similar discrepancy 
occurs with the opening price. If two or more data points exist between 09:30 and 09:31, the last value is 
reported as the price at 09:31, but the very first value is reported as the opening price on a daily frequency. 
In empirical analyses below, the daily close-to-close or open-to-close returns (RUCC and RUOC) and the 
like are based on true opening and closing values. However, the difference is extremely small and the 
results are almost identical even if the values at 09:31 and 16:00 are treated as the opening and closing 
prices.  
11 Although this daily close-to-close return in New York is recorded on the previous calendar date, it is 
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These correlation coefficients are displayed with 95% confidence bands derived from the null 
of zero correlation in Figure 4. They are positive and of no small magnitude until 09:21. Namely, 
correlations with preceding RUCCt–1 persist for about twenty minutes after the opening of the 
TSE. There are spikes at 09:01, 09:06, 09:11, 09:16 and 09:21, but they disappear when the 
sample period is restricted to before March 1997. Thus, these spikes are most likely related to 
five-minute periodicity in autocorrelation coefficients mentioned in Section I.A. After 09:21 
correlation coefficients are roughly close to zero, except at and for several minutes after 12:31 
(opening of the afternoon session) when they are significantly negative. Thus far, the pattern is 
similar to that of mean returns of Figure 1. A notable difference exists toward the end of the day. 
While mean returns indicate that stock prices rise toward the end of the day, they are totally 
uncorrelated with previous day’s movements in New York.  
Next we reverse the direction and compute correlation coefficients between each one-minute 
S&P500 return and the preceding daily close-to-close return observed in Tokyo (RJCC). In this 
instance, the daily return in Tokyo is the one observed on the same calendar date as New York 
because the close of Tokyo at 15:00 JST is 01:00 EST (Eastern Standard Time) in New York and 
the NYSE opens its trading eight and a half hours later on the same day (see Figure 2). These 
coefficients are plotted in Figure 5. There are significantly positive correlations in the first fifteen 
                                                                                                                                                                 
observed only three hours before the opening of the Tokyo market since 16:00 in New York is 06:00 the 
next day in Tokyo (see Figure 2).  
 15
minutes (until 09:45), but their magnitude is far less than that of Tokyo. After the initial responses, 
coefficients seem to be random around zero.  
In both Tokyo and New York, the responses to the other’s daily movements dissipate within 
the first fifteen to twenty minutes of daily trades. Thus, information from the other market seems 
to be rather quickly absorbed and this may indicate efficiency of the two stock markets.   
 
 
3.2  Regression analysis: effect of New York on Tokyo 
The main purpose of this paper is to determine how the other market affects one-minute 
returns of the day and especially how rapidly the effects are dissipated at the opening of daily 
trades. In order to investigate this effect, regression analysis taking into account other effects on 
the stock returns may be more appropriate than computing simple correlation coefficients. 
One-minute returns averaged across days as plotted in Figures 1 and 3 exhibit non–random 
behavior immediately after the opening and toward the closing of the day. In Tokyo, the returns 
are significantly negative at and after the opening of the afternoon session. This pattern may be 
evidence of serial correlation that persists for a few minutes. In addition, as discussed above, 
returns are correlated with the same values of the previous day, indicating a daily periodicity. A 
model of this influence should take into account both short-run serial correlation and daily 
periodicity.  
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Thus, our model of one-minute TOPIX returns is specified as follows:  
                    (3) 
,
)(
11
5
1
tthhmmthhmm
i
t
i
hhmmhhmmt
uRUCCRJhhmm
ihhmmRJRJhhmm
++
+−+=
−−
=
∑
δγ
βα
where hhmm refers to a time of the day in hours and minutes and hhmm–i indicates the time i 
minutes prior to hhmm. In the case of TOPIX returns, hhmm takes the values from 0901 and 1100 
for the morning session and from 1231 to 1500 for the afternoon session (from 1301 to 1500 
before April 26, 1991 due to a longer lunch break). Therefore, (1000–3) refers to 09:57. However, 
(0901–1) and (0901–2) indicate 15:00 and 14:59 of the previous day respectively. Likewise, 
(1231–1) denotes 11:00. The subscript t denotes a date during our sample. The second term on the 
right-hand side of equation (3), tihhmmRJ )( − , captures serial correlation that lasts a few 
minutes. Due to the five-minute periodicity discussed in Section I.A. above, the lag order is set at 
five for this term. The third term  is inserted to account for daily periodicity. 
RUCC
,1−tRJhhmm
t–1 is the explanatory variable that is the focus of this exercise and is a daily close-to-close 
S&P500 return observed just prior to the opening of daily trades in Tokyo. hhmmδ  captures the 
effect of the previous day’s close-to-close return in New York on each one-minute return in 
Tokyo.  
Since the Tokyo Stock Exchange is open for four and a half hours each day, there are 270 
one-minute returns every day, and we ran 270 regressions for each return and obtained as many 
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coefficient estimates for hhmmδ . The sample period is from January 5, 1988 to November 27, 2003, 
and the number of observations is 2,374 for returns from 12:31 to 13:00 and 3,001 to 3,034 for 
others.12   
Estimation results of equation (3) at 9:01, 12:31, and 14:00 are presented in Table VI. The 
result for 14:00 (RJ1400) is given as a typical example of all other regressions. Figure 6 plots 270 
regression estimates of hhmmδ  together with their 95% confidence bands. It shows that 0901δ  is 
about 0.18 and that the coefficients decline rapidly. Most of the coefficients after 09:06 are 
trifling in magnitude and are not significantly different from zero. In other words, the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange reacts to the previous day’s movements in New York within the first six minutes 
after opening. This reaction speed is much faster than that indicated by the correlation 
coefficients of Figure 4 which exhibit positive correlation with RUCCt–1 up to around 09:21. 
These correlation coefficients only capture the pairwise relation between each one-minute return 
and RUCCt–1, hence they do not account for the lagged effects of immediate past returns. 
However, the regression equation takes serial correlation into account by adding lagged 
one-minute returns (the second term on the right-hand side of equation (3)). In fact, these lagged 
series are significantly positive in most regression equations. Consequently, we have negative 
                                                  
12 The slight difference in the number of observations is due to: 1. a few missing values, 2. a peculiar 
convention in the TSE whereby only morning sessions are held on the last and first day of the year, 3. 
during the earlier part of the sample period (before February 1989), two or three Saturdays per month were 
open for trading, but were only for the morning session.  
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evidence on the random walk hypothesis, which requires absence of serial correlation.13 Presence 
of serial correlation is also confirmed by autocorrelation coefficients which are significant up to 
forty minutes.  
Another interesting finding from the regressions is that, while returns in the past few minutes 
usually have a positive effect on the subsequent returns (see right columns of Table VI), the last 
return of the day (RJ1500) has a significantly negative effect on RJ0901 (see left columns of 
Table VI). Its coefficient is –0.20 with a t-statistic of 6.53. We noted above that there is a tendency 
for the TOPIX to rise toward the closing of the day (Figure 1), but this is reversed when the 
market opens the following day.  
Another remarkable fact shown in the middle columns of Table VI is that the coefficient for 
RUCCt–1 is significantly negative in a regression for RJ1231, which means that the opening price 
of the afternoon session reverses the reaction at the opening of the morning session. Furthermore, 
just as RJ0901 reacts negatively to the previous day’s closing (RJ1500-1), RJ1231 reacts 
negatively to the closing of the morning session (RJ1100). The coefficient on RJ1100 in a 
regression for RJ1231 is –0.207 with a t-statistic of 6.61. 
The left-hand-side variable lagged one day is significant in the regression for RJ0901 and 
                                                  
13 Serial correlation may not contradict the random walk hypothesis when minute-by-minute data is used, 
since absence of trading, which is likely at such a high frequency, leads to stale prices and therefore serial 
correlation.  
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RJ1231, which points to the necessity of including this term. Just one example of all other 
mundane results is given by the regression for RJ1400, in which RUCCt–1 is not significant. Three 
out of five lagged one-minute returns are significant, but the independent variable lagged one day 
is not.   
 
3.3  Regression analysis: effect of Tokyo on New York 
Next, we examine the effects of the Tokyo stock market on New York. We regress each of 
RUhhmmt (one-minute returns of S&P500 at each minute of the day t) on a constant, lagged 
one-minute returns of the preceding three minutes, the return at the same time the day before, and 
a daily close-to-close return observed in Tokyo prior to the opening of the NYSE: 
                (4) 
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where RJCCt is the daily close-to-close return of the TOPIX observed eight and a half hours 
before the opening of the New York stock market. As in equation (3), we include lagged 
one-minute returns (the second term on the right-hand side of (4)), but the lag order is three, 
which seems to be enough to capture the very short-run serial correlation in RUhhmm.   
Estimation results at 09:31 and 15:00 are presented in left and middle columns of Table VII. 
When the NYSE opens in the morning, RJCCt–1 has a significantly positive and the lagged 
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dependent variable (RU0931t–1) a significantly negative effect on RU0931. But the previous day’s 
final one-minute return at the closing has no effect.  
The result for RU1500 is displayed as a typical example of all other regressions, where 
RJCCt–1 has no effect. Of the three lagged one-minute returns, only that of one minute previously 
is significant. The dependent variable lagged one day is not significant either.  
The estimated coefficients on hhmmδ  are presented in Figure 7. Comparing Figure 7 with 
Figure 6, we initially notice that the first several coefficients in Figure 7 are significant but that 
they are much smaller in magnitude than those in Figure 6. Thus, the effect of the Tokyo stock 
market on the New York market is far weaker than the reverse effect. There are possibly two 
reasons for the small effect of Tokyo on New York. First, the U.S. economy is apparently more 
important to the Japanese economy than the other way round. In fact, the dominant effect of the 
U.S. stock prices on other countries’ stock prices is well documented in many studies (e.g., Eun 
and Shim (1989)). Second, although New York is the nearest predecessor to Tokyo, closing right 
before Tokyo opens, the NYSE opens eight and a half hours after the TSE closes. In the meantime 
Frankfurt and London start their daily trading before New York. Tsutsui and Hirayama (2004a) 
analyze these four countries using daily closing prices and report a finding that the market which 
closes immediately before one market has the largest effect. In light of this finding, it would be 
natural to have a small effect of Tokyo on New York due to the intervening effects of Frankfurt 
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and London.  
To account for these effects, we include the daily close-to-close return in FAZ Index of 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange (RGCCt) in the regression equation: 
           (5) 
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where hhmmε  captures the effect of Frankfurt on New York. The effect of London’s daily closing 
cannot be incorporated, because London’s closing time is later than the opening of the NYSE (see 
Figure 2). London closes its daily trading at 16:30 GMT, which is 11:30 EST in New York. 
Namely, when New York opens at 09:30 local time, London’s closing value is not yet known. 
Thus, we had to drop London’s daily close-to-close return variable.14 The Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange, on the other hand, is open for trading between 10:30 and 13:30 local time. This closing 
time is two hours before opening of New York (Figure 2). Frankfurt’s daily close-to-close return 
is known to New York, the effect of which is captured by hhmmε  in equation (5) above.  
We ran a regression for this equation and the estimated 0931ε  is about 0.04215 (see the right 
columns of Table VII) which is greater than 028.00931 =δ  in equation (4) (see the left columns of 
Table VII). However, it is only one-quarter of the effect of New York on Tokyo (see the left 
                                                  
14 If we had intra-day data of London, we could compute a return up to the time of New York’s opening to 
capture the effect of London on New York. Unfortunately we could obtain only daily closing prices for 
London and Frankfurt, which compelled us to disregard this effect of London.  
 
15 This coefficient does not change much even if RJCCt is excluded from equation (5).  
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columns of Table VI and ). The result seems to vindicate our two conjectures 
above offered as an explanation for the small effect of Tokyo on New York. Though this 
smallness is partly caused by the intervening market in Frankfurt, Frankfurt’s effect on New York 
is also very small compared with the effect of New York on Tokyo, which implies a dominant 
influence of New York on other markets. 
045.04178.0 ≈÷
We report, in passing, the estimated 0931δ  in equation (5). It is now 0.015, which is roughly 
half that in equation (4). 0932δ  is also significantly positive, but not after the first two minutes. 
This reduction implies that about half of Tokyo’s effect on New York as measured by equation (4) 
is absorbed by Frankfurt.  
Next, in Figure 7, coefficients up to RU0944 tend to be significant, which means it takes the 
NYSE about fourteen minutes to absorb new information from Tokyo. Closer inspection reveals 
that eight out of fourteen coefficients on RJCCt are statistically significant. The first two 
coefficients at 09:31 and 09:32 are significant at a 5% significance level, but subsequently they 
are significant in regressions for RU0934, RU0938, RU0939, RU0940, RU0943, and RU0944. 
When we examine the effect of Frankfurt on New York in equation (5), it is significant for most 
of the first fifteen minutes after 09:31.16 Since the reaction time is six minutes in Tokyo, the 
reaction time of New York is longer than that of Tokyo.  
                                                  
16 This result is basically unaltered even if RJCCt is dropped from equation (5).  
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In view of the fact on the serial correlation shown below, the above results should not be 
interpreted that TSE is generally more efficient than NYSE. It may be explained by the fact that 
the opening price of the Tokyo Stock Exchange is formed by a batch process (itayose, see 
Footnote 7), in which trading orders are accepted during sixty minutes prior to the market 
opening at 09:00. However, in the New York Stock Exchange, the usual continuous trading 
process determines the opening price. We infer, then, that the stale-price problem is more serious 
in New York.  
A careful perusal of the regression results reveals some interesting contrasts between the two 
markets. First, in New York, the effects of the three lagged one-minute returns are significant 
during the first ten minutes after opening, but for the rest of the day, only the immediately 
preceding one-minute return is significant. However, in Tokyo, many, if not all, of the five lagged 
returns are always significant throughout the day. In other words, serial correlation in one-minute 
returns is more apparent in Japan than in New York (compare right columns of Table VI and 
middle columns of Table VII). This is also supported by evidence from autocorrelation 
coefficients. They indicate correlations are significant for up to forty minutes in Tokyo but only 
up to ten minutes in New York (results are not shown). The results may support the view that 
NYSE is more informationally efficient than TSE (see Footnote13). 
Another difference is that, in New York, the previous day’s closing price does not affect the 
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opening price, but it does so in a significantly negative way in Tokyo (compare left columns of 
Tables VI and VII). These differences must be explained by different market microstructure, 
which is left as a question for future investigation. 
 
3.4  What returns do the markets react to? 
 In the previous section, we assume that the markets react to daily close-to-close returns. 
Since the media, such as TV and newspapers, regularly announce this return, this assumption is 
reasonable. In this subsection, we will investigate whether the markets react to the information 
from more specific periods than the close-to-close return. 
The close-to-close return of the TOPIX (RJCC) can be divided into a close-to-open return 
(RJ0901; nontrading-hours return) and an open-to-close return (RJOC; trading-hours return). 
RJOC can further be divided into a morning return (RJMN; 9:01 to 12:31) and an afternoon return 
(RJAN; 12:31 to 15:00).  
Likewise, the close-to-close return of S&P500, RUCC, is divided into a close-to-open 
return, RUCO, an open-to-close return, RUOC, a morning return, RUMN, and an afternoon return, 
RUAN, where morning means 9:31 to 13:00 and afternoon is 13:01 to 16:00.17
Let us first look at correlations between these returns, which are shown in Table VIII. 
                                                  
17 RUCO is the close-to-open overnight return, which is slightly different from RU0931 that is defined as 
the return between 16:00 in the previous day and 09:31. See Note 10.  
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While RUOC highly correlates with RUCC (coefficient is 0.995), the correlation coefficient 
between RUCO and RUCC is only 0.28. Actually, RUOC is almost identical to RUCC, which can 
also be ascertained by their means and standard deviations in Table V. This fact leads us to expect 
that the Tokyo market reacts to RUOC just the same way as to RUCC in equation (3). Indeed, 
replacing RUCC with RUOC in regression equation (3) yields nearly the same results. The same 
applies to RJOC and RJCC in equation (4).  
In order to find out which return the markets react to, we compare the explanatory power 
of the returns in equation (3) or in equation (4). For the ease of exposition, let us refer to equation 
(3) as Model A and the equation in which RUCC is replaced with some other return as Model B. 
Construction of these models requires a non-nested test, because neither is a subset of the other 
model. In this paper we apply Deaton’s F test (Deaton, 1982).18 In this test, we compare Model A 
and B, and focus on the variables that are not included in the other model. In the test of Model A 
(equation 3) vs. Model B (RUxx replaces RUCC in equation 3), equation (3) is run first; then we 
add the alternative return variable and test the explanatory power of this variable by a standard F 
test (equivalent to a t test, since there is only one additional variable). If the additional variable is 
statistically significant, Model B is selected over Model A. In the test of Model B vs. Model A, 
Model B is run first; then we add RUCC and test the explanatory power of RUCC. If RUCC is 
                                                  
18 The J test (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1981) and the double log likelihood ratio test are alternative tests 
of non-nested models.  
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significant, Model A is selected over Model B. Naturally, a pair of these tests may not produce an 
unequivocal result. 
P-values of the test for the first seven minutes of TOPIX returns are presented in Table IX, 
since the first six minutes are the time the Tokyo market significantly reacts to New York. In the 
left columns, we compare additional explanatory power of RUOC and RUCC. When RUOC is 
added to equation (3) (Model A), RUOC is significant at a 10% level for three cases out of seven 
(see the second column).19 The third column shows the results when RUCC is added to Model B. 
Three cases out of seven cases are significant, implying RUOC and RUCC have almost the same 
explanatory power. The result is reasonable because RUOC and RUCC are almost identical 
series. 
Comparing RUCO and RUCC, while RUCC is significant in six cases, RUCO is significant 
only in three cases. This implies that the close-to-close return is more important and is the one 
focused on by Japanese investors. Similar results are obtained for the morning return (RUMN) 
and the afternoon return (RUAN). In summary, Table IX suggests that the Tokyo market watches 
the close-to-close return more than other returns, probably because this is what the media usually 
reports. RUOC has strong explanatory power simply because it is almost identical to RUCC. 
The same procedure is applied to equation (4) to compare the explanatory power of RJCC 
                                                  
19 We also provide the number of significant cases at a 5% level in the Table, which leads to the same 
conclusions. 
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with other returns such as RJOC and the results for the first fifteen minutes are shown in Table X. 
In the first pair, RJOC is significant in six cases at a 10% level, just as RJCC is. RJ0901 is 
significant in six cases, RJCC in fourteen cases. RJMN and RJAN are significant only in one and 
two cases, while RJCC is significant in eight cases. These results suggest the same conclusion as 
the Tokyo market: the close-to-close return of TOPIX is what the U.S. investors focus on.  
 
4.  Changes in the linkage over sub-periods 
 In order to examine whether the response pattern has changed during our sample period, we 
divide the whole sample into three subperiods and conduct the same analysis of the previous 
section. Figure 8 shows the daily closing prices of S&P500 and TOPIX. It seems reasonable to 
divide the whole period into the following three subperiods: 
Period I: January 5, 1988 to December 31, 1989 when stock prices exhibited an upward trend in 
both the U.S. and Japan. 
Period II: January 4, 1990 to October 15, 1998, when stock prices in the U.S. exhibited an upward 
trend, while those in Japan fell significantly at first and were stagnant thereafter. 
Period III: October 16, 1998 to November 27, 2003, when stock prices in both countries moved in 
a similar fashion, exhibiting an inverted U-shaped pattern. 
We regress equation (3) by OLS and the sum of coefficients on RUCCt–1 in regressions for 
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RJhhmm cumulated over each one-minute interval is depicted in Figure 9 for the Tokyo stock 
market. Thus, the graph shows cumulative effects of the S&P500 on the TOPIX during the course 
of a day’s trading. Individual coefficients are statistically significant only at the beginning of the 
day. Others are seldom significant, thus rendering the cumulative sums statistically not very 
meaningful. However, even though they are not different from zero statistically, whenever they 
tend to be positive over successive minutes the cumulative sum tends to rise, which does imply 
that the effect from the other market is cumulatively positive. Thus, aside from strict statistical 
significance, we can infer a general direction of the other market’s influence during the day from 
this graph. Figure 9, which plots these cumulative sums for three subperiods, reveals the 
following: 
1) The efficiency in terms of length of reaction time has increased over the sixteen-year 
period. In Period I, positive responses continue until around 09:30 and thereafter negative 
responses follow during the morning session. In Period II, positive responses dissipate by 
around 09:15 and the decline afterwards is much smaller. Period III exhibits a rapid 
increase after the opening and the peak is observed at 09:06, indicating a rise in efficiency 
in absorbing effects from New York.  
2) The magnitude of the cumulative reaction has become greater, from around 0.1 for Period 
I to 0.3 for Period III. Two reasons can be offered. One is that the increase reflects 
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intensified economic integration between the U.S. and Japan. The other is that the relative 
size of the Tokyo stock market to the New York stock market, as measured by annual 
turnover, has declined over the period. Figure 10 plots the annual turnover in New York 
and Tokyo Stock Exchanges. Tokyo’s turnover exceeded that of New York in 1988 and 
1989. However, the Japanese stock prices have declined and stagnated since then, 
whereas the New York market has seen a spectacular rise in the 1990s. Thus, the U.S. 
turnover has grown tremendously, dwarfing that of Tokyo.  
3) A negative response at the opening of the afternoon session is visible in all three 
subperiods. In Period I when the afternoon session started at 13:00 this negative response 
is observed at 13:01.   
Cumulative sums of coefficients on RJCC in regression equation (4) for the New York stock 
market are displayed in Figure 11. Efficiency seems to have improved from Period I to Period II. 
Specifically, positive responses, small in magnitude, continue for about two hours after the 
opening in Period I, but in Periods II and III initial positive responses abate in about fifteen 
minutes after opening. The overall magnitude of cumulative responses is much higher in Period 
III than in Period I or II. However, it is much smaller than that of Tokyo. This is probably due to 
the relative importance of the economy.  
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 5.  Is there asymmetry in the reaction as the other market rises or falls? 
 In order to see if there is asymmetry in responses to the other market’s rise or fall, we 
regress Japanese returns on positive RUCCt–1 and on negative RUCCt–1 separately. Although the 
regression equation is equation (3), we divide the observations into one group where is 
positive and another where RUCC
1−tRUCC
t–1 is negative. Thus, we ran two sets of regressions. The 
resultant estimates are displayed in Figure 12, in which cumulative sums of coefficients are 
shown. The cumulative responses to the positive and negative RUCCt–1 are remarkably similar.  
Likewise, estimating equation (4) with positive and negative RJCCt separately, we compute 
the cumulative sums of coefficients for the New York stock market reacting to positive and 
negative RJCCt values which are depicted in Figure 13. Unlike Tokyo, New York exhibits clear 
asymmetry in reaction. Bad news from Japan has a considerably stronger effect on New York 
than good news. The magnitude of the response in New York to a fall in Tokyo is roughly double 
that of a rise. The response pattern is also different: when Tokyo has advanced, responses in New 
York are spread over a longer period, about one and a half hours, but when Tokyo has fallen, 
positive responses swiftly reach a peak within about fourteen minutes. This asymmetry in 
reaction to a rise or fall in Tokyo is in contrast to the finding of Tokyo’s symmetric responses to 
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New York.20  
This asymmetry in New York might be strongly influenced by the rapid declines in the 
TOPIX during the period from January 1990 to July 1992 (see Figure 8). To check on this 
possibility, we divided the sample into three subperiods as above and ran the same regressions. 
We again obtained asymmetric responses in New York to a rise or fall in Japan in all three 
subperiods, indicating asymmetry throughout the sixteen-year period. Why investors in New 
York are more sensitive about the fall in Tokyo is another agenda for future research.  
 
6.  Conclusions 
 This paper explores how rapidly the Tokyo and New York stock markets respond to the 
movements of the stock price index of the other market using high-frequency data over the period 
from January 5, 1988 to November 27, 2003. Estimating the reactions of one-minute returns of 
one country to the preceding daily return of the other country, we find that: 
1) A positive response of the Tokyo stock market dissipates within six minutes, while that of 
New York dissipates within fourteen minutes, implying that both markets are fairly efficient. 
The TSE is more efficient in absorbing the impact at the opening than NYSE, possibly 
                                                  
20 Analyzing the daily stock price index data from 1975 to 1995 for the U.S., the U.K., Germany, and 
Japan, Hirayama and Tsutsui (1998b) found that negative large changes have a clearer effect than positive 
ones. 
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because TSE employs a batch process called itayose for forming the opening price.  
2) The magnitude of the response is around 0.054 (cumulative sum for the first fourteen 
minutes) for the New York stock market and 0.22 (cumulative sum for the first six minutes) 
for Tokyo. Thus, the effect of New York on Tokyo is over four times greater than the reverse 
effect. 
3) The efficiency of the two markets measured by the response time has improved over the 
period. The magnitude of the response has grown for the Tokyo stock market over the three 
periods, while that of the New York stock market has grown between the first and the 
second period. 
4) The response of the Tokyo stock market is symmetric in terms of a fall or rise in New York, 
while the response of the New York stock market to a fall in Tokyo is twice as great as that 
to a rise. 
5) The opening price of the afternoon session of the Tokyo stock market negatively responds 
to the previous movement in New York. 
Determining the causes of interesting findings 4) and 5) remains an agenda for future research. 
We suggested, however, that 5) is the result of giving a second thought over lunch to the excessive 
response at the opening of the day.  
The reaction time is on the average six minutes for Japan and fourteen minutes for the U.S. 
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This is consistent with the findings on stock price reactions to earnings and dividend 
announcements (Patell and Wolfson (1984)), but it is far slower than adjustments in foreign 
exchange markets which typically adjust to news announcements within one minute (Ederington 
and Lee (1995)). The difference may be explained by the different nature of the two markets. 
There are vastly more participants, both individuals and institutional investors, in a stock market 
than in a foreign exchange market. The stock market is also a place of the ‘beauty contest’ as 
Keynes once likened it, where investors carefully observe others before deciding on their strategy. 
Market participants in foreign exchange are primarily professional dealers and institutional 
investors who have access to electronic news releases, etc., and are, thus, able to execute 
transactions extremely rapidly.  
The different response time at the market opening can be partly explained by the itayose 
process of matching buy and sell orders in the TSE. The market microstructure must play a role in 
determining the response time, which is an agenda for the future. Different behavioral patterns 
may also be a part of the picture, but we await research in behavioral finance comparing the two 
markets’ participants. 21
                                                  
21According to a questionnaire survey of stock investors in both Japan and the U.S. reported in Shiller et al. 
(1996), wishful thinking distinctly characterizes Japanese investors.  
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Table I. Summary Statistics of Selected TOPIX Returns 
 Mean Max. Min. S.D. LB Q(5) N. Obs. 
RJCC –0.005414 9.544252 –7.099952 1.241356 0.000000 3946 
RJOC –0.028921 9.535624 –7.077842 1.120321 0.000000 3946 
RJMN –0.061056 4.928397 –7.383014 0.848256 0.000000 3878 
RJAN 0.027906 4.986915 –4.181279 0.651292 0.000000 3882 
       
RJ0901 0.022538 1.290985 –1.384551 0.300236 0.000000 3946 
RJ0902 0.009977 0.531608 –0.467999 0.122559 0.000444 3946 
RJ0903 0.002953 0.313808 –0.370573 0.066933 0.133961 3946 
RJ0904 0.002050 0.335886 –0.307720 0.053931 0.281170 3946 
RJ0905 –0.000182 0.304305 –0.259738 0.049527 0.015431 3946 
RJ0906 0.005068 0.874180 –0.837865 0.129583 0.000406 3946 
RJ0907 –0.000177 0.372772 –0.415340 0.054780 0.020173 3946 
RJ0908 –0.000180 0.293806 –0.294364 0.048681 0.194841 3946 
RJ0909 –0.002076 0.287059 –0.336252 0.046205 0.040236 3946 
RJ0910 –0.001682 0.257447 –0.231399 0.042652 0.040273 3946 
RJ0911 –0.000919 0.628561 –0.678866 0.070972 0.000000 3946 
RJ0912 –0.001643 0.338236 –0.303619 0.043420 0.148306 3946 
RJ0913 –0.002397 0.225850 –0.258847 0.041816 0.389702 3946 
RJ0914 –0.001593 0.265057 –0.300950 0.041100 0.538632 3946 
RJ0915 –0.000664 0.331735 –0.263754 0.040282 0.188328 3946 
       
RJ1231 –0.020839 0.495607 –0.512869 0.110544 0.000000 3080 
RJ1232 –0.006396 0.374045 –0.272433 0.053161 0.000522 3080 
RJ1233 –0.004164 0.233465 –0.237738 0.036479 0.191377 3080 
       
RJ1456 0.002471 0.336507 –0.223676 0.042856 0.810936 3891 
RJ1457 0.002008 0.295976 –0.361518 0.044994 0.757910 3891 
RJ1458 0.006019 0.310071 –0.434954 0.050495 0.505516 3891 
RJ1459 0.007532 0.429410 –0.331767 0.053642 0.147413 3891 
RJ1500 0.031975 0.881639 –0.613469 0.142120 0.000000 3891 
 
Notes: Variables are TOPIX returns (in percent). RJOC is daily open-to-close return, RJMN morning 
return from 09:01 to 12:31 (opening of the afternoon session), RJAN afternoon return from 12:31 to 15:00. 
RJhhmm where hhmm is 0902, …, 1500 is a one-minute return except RJ0901 which is daily 
close-to-open (overnight) return and RJ1231 which is a 61-min. return over the lunch break. S.D. is the 
standard deviation. LB Q(5) is the Ljung–Box Q statistic which tests the null hypothesis that every 
autocorrelation coefficient up to the fifth order is zero. p-values are shown in this column. The sample 
period is from January 5, 1988 to November 27, 2003. See Footnote 12 for the reasons for different 
numbers of observations.  
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Table II. Correlation Coefficients between TOPIX 8-Min. Return at Closing 
and Selected TOPIX Returns 
 
?  RJ08M1500 RJ0901 RJ14M0915 RJ0901+1 RJ14M0915+1
RJ08M1500 1.0000      
RJ0901 0.0104  1.0000     
RJ14M0915 0.0267  0.5741  1.0000    
RJ0901+1 –0.0306  0.0806  0.0428  1.0000   
RJ14M0915+1 –0.0115  0.0214  0.0348  0.5740  1.0000  
 
Notes: RJ08M1500 is the last 8-min. return to closing at 15:00, RJ0901 the close-to-open 
overnight return, RJ14M0915 a 14-min. return to 09:15, and RJCC the daily close-to-close 
return. The subscript, +1, denotes a one-day lead (the next day).  
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Table III.  Correlation Coefficients between Selected TOPIX Returns 
 RJ0901 RJ45M1000 RJ1231 
RJ0901 1.0000   
RJ45M1000 –0.0288 1.0000  
RJ1231 –0.0348 0.0554 1.0000 
 
Notes: RJ0901 is the overnight return from the previous day’s close to the opening, 
RJ45M1000 is the 45-min. return from 09:15 to 10:00, and RJ1231 is the 
one-and-a-half hour return during the lunch break. The sample period is from April 
30, 1991 to November 27, 2003. 
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Table IV. OLS Regressions to Explain RJ1231 
 Eq. (i) Eq. (ii) Eq. (iii) 
Variable Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val.
Constant –0.018 0.000 –0.020 0.000 –0.017 0.000
RJ0901 –0.013 0.062 –0.011 0.065 –0.011 0.109
RJ45M1000   0.016 0.003 0.019 0.004
RJ1100 –0.205 0.000   –0.208  0.000 
RJ1059 0.103 0.102   0.096  0.124 
RJ1058 0.066 0.321   0.064  0.335 
RJ1057 –0.011 0.874   –0.012  0.862 
RJ1056 0.101 0.122   0.099  0.129 
RJ1231–1 0.082 0.000   0.083 0.000
2R  0.023  0.004  0.026  
p-value of F test 0.000  0.002  0.000  
Num. of Obs. 2371  3077  2371  
 
Notes: The dependent variable is RJ1231, over-lunch return from 11:00 to 12:31. RJ0901 
is the overnight return from the previous day’s close to the opening price at 09:01. 
RJ45M1000 is the 45-min. return from 09:15 to 10:00. RJhhmm, where hhmm is 1056, 
…,1100, is the one-minute return up to hhmm. The subscript, –1, denotes a one-day lag. The 
sample period is from April 30, 1991 to November 27, 2003. The sample size is reduced in 
equations (i) and (iii) relative to equation (ii) due to the lagged dependent variable on the 
right-hand side. 
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Table V. Summary Statistics of Selected S&P500 Returns 
 Mean Max. Min. S.D. LB Q(5) N. Obs. 
RUCC 0.041675 5.451431 –6.865681 1.042395 0.019949 4014 
RUOC 0.036210 6.205689 –6.865681 1.017440 0.013549 4014 
RUMN –0.003487 4.023462 –4.341921 0.758387 0.000017 4014 
RUAN 0.039431 5.018159 –5.240286 0.637614 0.000000 4014 
       
RU0931 0.008265 1.401524 –1.649356 0.187130 0.000000 4014 
RU0932 0.001432 0.886300 –0.591704 0.079346 0.000035 4014 
RU0933 0.003773 0.677632 –0.487086 0.071638 0.000000 4014 
RU0934 0.002902 0.602593 –1.214823 0.070406 0.000022 4014 
RU0935 0.001415 0.434428 –0.502196 0.061016 0.477687 4014 
RU0936 0.001634 0.566342 –0.269207 0.056813 0.008024 4014 
RU0937 0.001818 0.371824 –0.587030 0.053691 0.010459 4014 
RU0938 0.000900 0.367519 –0.950650 0.054016 0.035783 4014 
RU0939 0.000352 0.369199 –0.588413 0.050169 0.088257 4014 
RU0940 –0.000672 0.975905 –1.347478 0.056239 0.012359 4014 
RU0941 0.000453 1.419375 –0.320305 0.048864 0.228742 4014 
RU0942 –0.000378 0.273372 –0.920964 0.048071 0.118098 4014 
RU0943 –0.000724 0.333264 –0.375926 0.043056 0.014997 4014 
RU0944 –0.000625 0.845680 –0.402200 0.044064 0.189095 4014 
RU0945 –0.001040 0.622440 –0.374209 0.042680 0.144755 4014 
RU0946 –0.000456 1.035158 –0.320899 0.042752 0.075252 4014 
RU0947 –0.000024 0.295632 –0.401757 0.042440 0.274315 4014 
RU0948 –0.000946 0.498991 –0.415385 0.042172 0.013457 4014 
RU0949 –0.000868 0.312094 –0.381088 0.041142 0.782206 4014 
RU0950 –0.001124 0.318218 –0.412264 0.041282 0.006747 4014 
       
RU1556 0.000446 0.225533 –0.161202 0.026527 0.515950 4014 
RU1557 0.000957 0.223683 –0.170993 0.026275 0.482934 4014 
RU1558 0.001198 0.132838 –0.212960 0.025592 0.061886 4014 
RU1559 0.002425 0.224797 –0.189719 0.026541 0.180678 4014 
RU1600 0.001906 0.189216 –0.231702 0.026650 0.115109 4014 
 
Notes: Variables are several S&P500 returns. RUCC is daily close-to-close return, RUOC daily 
open-to-close return, RUMN morning return from 09:31 to 13:00, and RUAN afternoon return from 13:01 
to 16:00. RUhhmm where hhmm is 0932, …, 1600 is a one-minute return except RU0931 which is 
close-to-open (overnight) return. S.D. is the standard deviation. LB Q(5) is the Ljung-Box Q statistic 
which tests the null hypothesis that every autocorrelation coefficient up to the fifth order is zero. p-values 
are shown in this column. The sample period is from January 5, 1988 to November 27, 2003.  
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 Table VI.  Selected Estimation Results of Eq. (3) 
 
RJ0901   RJ1231 RJ1400
Variable       Coeff. p-val. Variable Coeff. p-val. Variable Coeff. p-val. 
Constant       0.017 0.000 Constant –0.017 0.000 Constant 0.000 0.468
RUCC–1 0.178      
    
    
      
    
      
      
0.000 RUCC–1 –0.010 0.000 RUCC–1 –0.001 0.200
RJ1500–1 –0.202 0.000 RJ1100 –0.207 0.000 RJ1359 0.098 0.000
RJ1459–1 –0.049 0.564 RJ1059 0.088 0.156 RJ1358 0.054 0.004
RJ1458–1 0.039 0.645 RJ1058 0.060 0.364 RJ1357 0.050 0.006
RJ1457–1 –0.012 0.898 RJ1057 –0.004 0.951 RJ1356 0.020 0.302
RJ1456–1 0.145 0.157 RJ1056 0.097 0.134 RJ1355 0.022 0.237
RJ0901–1 0.025 0.085 RJ1231–1 0.085 0.000 RJ1400–1 –0.004 0.847
2R  0.369  2R  0.031  2R  0.017  
         p-val. of F 0.000 p-val. of F 0.000 p-val. of F 0.000
Num. Obs. 3034  Num. Obs. 2374  Num. Obs. 3001  
 
Notes: OLS estimation results of eq. (3) for RJ0901, RJ1231, and RJ1400 only are displayed above. The 
subscript –1 indicates a one-day lag. The sample period is from January 5, 1988 to November 27, 2003. 
‘p-val.’ is the p-value of a t-statistic on each explanatory variable. ‘p-val. of F’ is the p-value of the F test for 
the entire regression. For different numbers of observations see Footnote 12. The number of observations for 
RJ1231 is particularly small because 12:31 was in the middle of a lunch break before April 26, 1991.  
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 Table VII.  Selected Estimation Results of Equations (4) and (5) 
 
eq. (4) RU0931  eq. (4) RU1500 eq. (5)  RU0931 
Variable Coeff.     p-val. Variable Coeff. p-val. Variable Coeff. p-val.
Constant      
     
      
     
     
     
     
0.010 0.003 Constant 0.001 0.143 Constant 0.010 0.002
RJCC 0.028 0.000 RJCC –0.0002 0.582 RJCC 0.015 0.000
 RGCC 0.042 0.000
RU1600–1 0.003 0.980 RU1459 0.327 0.000 RU1600–1 –0.106 0.405
RU1559–1? 0.125 0.368 RU1458 0.002 0.925 RU1559–1 0.072 0.593
RU1558–1 0.250 0.070 RU1457 –0.019 0.309 RU1558–1 0.094 0.483
RU0931–1 –0.170 0.000 RU1500–1 0.014 0.392 RU0931–1 –0.192 0.000
2R  0.049  2R  0.112  2R  0.135  
p-val. of F 0.000  p-val. of F 0.000  p-val. of F 0.000  
Num. Obs. 3148  Num. Obs. 3148  Num. Obs. 3085  
 
Notes: OLS estimation results of eq. (4) for RU0931, RU1500 and of eq. (5) for RU0931 are 
displayed above. The subscript , –1, indicates a one-day lag. Sample period is from January 5, 1988 
to November 27, 2003. ‘p-val.’ is the p-value of a t-statistic on each explanatory variable. ‘p-val. of 
F’ is the p-value of the F test for the entire regression.  
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 Table VIII. Correlation Coefficients between Selected S&P500 and TOPIX Returns 
(a) S&P500 Returns 
 RUCC RUCO RUOC RUMN RUAN 
RUCC 1.0000     
RUCO 0.2805 1.0000    
RUOC 0.9948 0.1813 1.0000   
RUMN 0.7872 0.2399 0.7810 1.0000  
RUAN 0.6512 0.0043 0.6668 0.0554 1.0000 
Note: See notes to Table V for definition of the variables.   
 
 
(b) TOPIX Returns 
 RJCC RJ0901 RJOC RJMN RJAN 
RJCC 1.0000     
RJ0901 0.5027 1.0000    
RJOC 0.9728 0.2889 1.0000   
RJMN 0.8250 0.3584 0.8178 1.0000  
RJAN 0.6023 0.0313 0.6586 0.1056 1.0000 
 
Note: See notes to Table I for definition of the variables. Note that RJ0901 is 
the overnight return. RUCO is the close-to-open return of S&P500. See 
Footnote 10 for a minor discrepancy between RUCO and RU0931 
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Table IX.  Explanatory Power of RUCC and Other Returns: Deaton’s F-tests 
 
 A vs. B B vs. A A vs. B B vs. A  A vs. B B vs. A  A vs. B B vs. A 
  RUOC          
       
RUCC RUCO RUCC RUMN RUCC RUAN RUCC
RJ0901  0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
RJ0902  0.00000       
       
       
       
       
       
0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.74465 0.00000 0.31186 0.00000
RJ0903  0.34841 0.78735 0.34440 0.00000 0.00453 0.00000 0.00312 0.00763
RJ0904  0.51279 0.82115 0.51505 0.00015 0.81587 0.01247 0.93004 0.00370
RJ0905  0.29450 0.53887 0.30192 0.00048 0.34411 0.00097 0.24866 0.02995
RJ0906  0.00296 0.00018 0.00365 0.00000 0.07003 0.00016 0.01774 0.00000
RJ0907  0.43549 0.38935 0.43960 0.40759 0.24951 0.79681 0.19353 0.16491
10% signif. 3 3 3 6  3 6  3 6 
5% signif. 2 3 3 6  2 6  3 6 
 
Notes: See notes to Table V for definition of the variables. P-values of the F tests are shown in the 
Table. ‘A vs. B’. Deaton’s F test takes Model A as given and inserts additional variables that appear in 
Model B. If the F test of these variables is not significant, these variables from Model B do not have 
additional explanatory power, which implies a rejection of Model B. In our tests, only a single 
variable is added at a time, thus the F test is equivalent to a t test. ‘B vs. A’ reverses the procedure. 
‘10% signif.’ stands for the number of cases, out of seven trials, that the alternative variable is 
significant at a 10% level. ‘5% signif.’ is the same proportion at a 5% level. There are four pairs of 
Model A and B above: RUOC vs. RUCC, RUCO vs. RUCC, RUMN vs. RUCC, and RUAN vs. RUCC. 
Each row represents a regression equation explaining the variable indicated by the first column.   
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Table X.  Explanatory Power of RJCC and Other Returns: Deaton’s F-tests 
 
 A vs. B B vs. A  A vs. B B vs. A  A vs. B B vs. A  A vs. B B vs. A 
  RJOC           
           
RJCC RJ0901 RJCC RJMN RJCC RJAN RJCC
RU0931  0.00472 0.00000 0.00394 0.00000 0.44871 0.00000 0.51410 0.00000
RU0932  0.00000           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
0.00010 0.00000 0.00000 0.72998 0.01032 0.02049 0.01891
RU0933  0.00453 0.01070 0.00456 0.03588 0.74912 0.42705 0.09318 0.77480
RU0934  0.00172 0.00004 0.00177 0.02522 0.07548 0.00005 0.87920 0.00064
RU0935  0.59814 0.92552 0.59639 0.08288 0.43153 0.10340 0.32860 0.45676
RU0936  0.28287 0.49688 0.28345 0.07164 0.85631 0.43532 0.61764 0.34584
RU0937  0.05003 0.11015 0.05798 0.04696 0.74770 0.63248 0.51200 0.54707
RU0938  0.76636 0.22761 0.74273 0.00234 0.38694 0.00334 0.48720 0.00954
RU0939  0.05066 0.00204 0.05160 0.00138 0.98512 0.00370 0.32141 0.00001
RU0940  0.72722 0.86757 0.71209 0.05153 0.26335 0.03348 0.25197 0.32873
RU0941  0.81075 0.80163 0.82333 0.07280 0.47568 0.54970 0.55143 0.05257
RU0942  0.21232 0.39997 0.23473 0.06137 0.94958 0.42265 0.55186 0.42460
RU0943  0.56989 0.23213 0.57402 0.04912 0.35734 0.02402 0.55752 0.08851
RU0944  0.68715 0.09798 0.68856 0.00003 0.68121 0.00092 0.91463 0.00007
RU0945  0.35454 0.20199 0.33749 0.40006 0.64717 0.21135 0.97990 0.22655
10% signif. 6 6  6 14  1 8  2 8 
5% signif. 4 5  4 9  0 8  1 6 
 
Notes: See notes to Table I for definition of the variables. P-values of the F tests are shown in 
the Table. For the test procedure, see notes to Table IX. ‘10% signif.’ stands for the number of 
cases, out of fifteen trials, that the alternative variable is significant at a 10% level. ‘5% 
signif.’ is the same based on a 5% level. There are four pairs of Model A and B above: RJOC 
vs. RJCC, RJ0901 vs. RJCC, RJMN vs. RJCC, and RJAN vs. RJCC. Each row represents a 
regression equation explaining the variable indicated by the first column.  
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Figure 1  Daily Averages of TOPIX One-Minute Returns
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Notes: One-minute returns of TOPIX are averaged across days. The sample period is from January 5, 1988 to November 27, 2003. 
The sample size varies between 3,080 and 3,946. See Table I for the differing sample sizes.  95% confidence bands are shown for 
the null of a zero mean.  
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             Figure 2 Opening and Closing Times of the Four Markets 
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Notes: GMT stands for Greenwich Mean Time. Local time is in 
parentheses. JP, GR, UK, and US stand for the Tokyo, Frankfurt, 
London, and New York Stock Exchanges, respectively. 
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Figure 3  Daily Averages of S&P500 One-Minute Returns
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Notes: One-minute returns of S&P500 are averaged across days. The sample period is from January 5, 1988 to November 27, 
2003. The sample size is 4014. 95% confidence bands are shown for the null of a zero mean. 
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Figure 4 Correlation Coefficient of TOPIX 1 Min-Returns
with Previous Day's Close-to-Close Daily Return of S&P500 (RUCC)
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Notes: RJhhmm, where hhmm is the hours and minutes of the time of day, is the one-minute return of TOPIX. Notice there is a lunch break between 
11:00 and 12:30. Correlation coefficients between each of RJhhmm and RUCCt-1 (previous day’s close-to-close daily return of S&P500) are plotted. 
The sample period is from January 5, 1988 to November 27, 2003. The sample size is 3080 for the half-hour duration from 12:31 to 13:00 due to a 
longer lunch break before April 26, 1991 and is between 3891 and 3946 for other times. See Footnote 12 for description of this difference in the 
sample size. Upper and lower bounds indicate 95% confidence bands for the null of a zero correlation coefficient. 
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Figure 5  Corrrelation Coefficient of S&P500 1-Min. Returns with
Previous Day's Close-to-Close Daily Return of TOPIX (RJCC)
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Note: RUhhmm, where hhmm is the hours and minutes of the time of day, is the one-minute return of S&P500. Correlation 
coefficients between each of RUhhmm and RJCCt (previously observed close-to-close daily return of TOPIX) are plotted. 
The sample period is from January 5, 1988 to November 27, 2003. The sample size is 4014. Upper and lower bounds indicate 
95% confidence bands for the null of a zero correlation coefficient. 
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Figure 6  Regression Coefficients on RUCC
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
R
J
0
9
0
1
R
J
0
9
1
1
R
J
0
9
2
1
R
J
0
9
3
1
R
J
0
9
4
1
R
J
0
9
5
1
R
J
1
0
0
1
R
J
1
0
1
1
R
J
1
0
2
1
R
J
1
0
3
1
R
J
1
0
4
1
R
J
1
0
5
1
R
J
1
2
3
1
R
J
1
2
4
1
R
J
1
2
5
1
R
J
1
3
0
1
R
J
1
3
1
1
R
J
1
3
2
1
R
J
1
3
3
1
R
J
1
3
4
1
R
J
1
3
5
1
R
J
1
4
0
1
R
J
1
4
1
1
R
J
1
4
2
1
R
J
1
4
3
1
R
J
1
4
4
1
R
J
1
4
5
1
Coeff.
Upper Bound
Lower Bound
 
Note: This plots regression coefficients on RUCCt-1 of equation (3), 
, and their 95% confidence bands. They capture the effect 
of previous day’s close-to-close return of S&P500 on each of the TOPIX one-minute returns. See notes to Figure 4. 
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Figure 7  Regression Coefficients on RJCC
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Note: This plots regression coefficients on RJCCt of equation (4) 
, and their 95% confidence bands. They represent 
effects of the preceding close-to-close daily return of TOPIX on each one-minute return of S&P500.  See notes to Figure 5. 
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Figure 8  Daily Closing Values of S&P500 and TOPIX
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Note: Daily closing values are from TickData.com and the TSE.   
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Figure 9  Cumulative Sum of Regression Coefficients on RUCC : Three Subperiods
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Note: Each line is a cumulative sum of regression coefficients on RUCCt-1 for three subperiods. Period I is from January 5, 1988 to December 21, 
1989, Period II from January 4, 1990 to October 15, 1998, Period III from Oct. 16, 1998 to November 27, 2003. Notice that there do not actually 
exist regressions for RJ1231, …, RJ1300 for Period I because the lunch break was from 11:00 to 13:00 before April 26, 1991.  
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Figure 10  Annual Turnover of NYSE and TSE
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Note: The data source is the respective Stock Exchanges. The value of the TSE is converted into US dollars using annual average yen/dollar 
rate retrieved from the IMF International Financial Statistics CD-ROM.  
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Figure 11  Cumulative Sum of Regression Coefficients on RJCC: Three Subperiods
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Note: Each line is a cumulative sum of regression coefficients on RJCCt in equation (4) for three subperiods. See also 
notes to Figure 8. 
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Figure 12 Cumulative Sum of Regression Coefficients on Positive
and Negative RUCC
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Note: Regression equation (3) is estimated separately for positive and negative RUCCt-1.  
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Figure 13  Cumulative Sum of  Regression Coefficients
on Positive and Negative RJCC
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Note
: Regression equation (4) is estimated separately for positive and negative RJCCt. 
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